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Introduction 
Initial Public Offering (IPO) is a way for company to raise additional capital, increase liquidity 
and an important source of growth in modern economic environment. Aside from direct impact of 
raising funds, IPO serves additional purposes: it sets obligatory standards for company and thus 
increases reputation, reduces cost of bank borrowing, makes possible to use additional ways of fund 
raising such as convertible bonds and different forms of equity funding.  
First Russian company went on IPO at 1996 and ever since more than 140 Russian companies 
have been listed on stock exchanges. Number of IPOs peaked at 2005-2007 with 74 companies went 
public over 3 years – about half of total number of Russian IPOs. After a recession and dramatic 
decrease in number of IPOs during World Financial Crisis, Russian markets started to recover at 2011 
but already in 2014 faced new downturn caused by sanctions, outflow capital from the country and 
investors’ skeptical sentiment towards economic situation. Despite fluctuations at Russian capital 
markets, equity raising in the country  was normalizing during last two years and is expected to grow 
even further in the future (Baker, McKenzie, & Oxford Economics, 2015). 
When going IPO, company has a chance to choose preferable stock exchange to list its share 
if it meets stock exchange’s requirements. Historically, two largest stock exchanges for Russian 
corporations to go public are Moscow’s RTS (Russian Trade Systems) and MOEX (Moscow Stock 
Exchange) or London’s LSE (London Stock Exchange). In addition, some companies chose to do dual 
listing and issue shares at both locations. There are several companies that chose to go public at Honk-
Kong, New York, or Frankfurt but around 70% of overall listed Russian companies did IPO at LSE 
or MOEX/RTS exactly.  
When IPO is finished company may face situation know as underpricing. Underpricing of an 
IPO is calculated as difference between initial price of stock and price of stock after first day of trades 
divided by initial price. If a company experienced an underpricing of its shares, it means it lost portion 
of value it could get if stocks were listed at fair (first day closing) price. Naturally, any company aims 
at setting the most appropriate price to maximize value of an IPO and interested in factors that can 
potentially affect initial share price. In this paper IPO, underpricing sometimes will be referred to as 
IPO performance. This term is used in a number of empirical studies devoted to IPO underpricing. 
Board of directors is essential element of corporate governance system of any publicly traded 
company. Better quality of a board will reflect in better supervising and monitoring of company’s 
performance and stronger link between management and shareholders. Not surprisingly, investors pay 
attention to various characteristics of board of directors of a company and attribute different value to 
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a firm depending on quality of a board. As the role of Board of Directors in governing the company 
in Russia increases (PWC, 2015), firms should pay more and more attention to composition of its 
board before going public.  
Problem of relation of IPO underpricing and characteristics of board of directors is deeply 
researched in respect to developed markets. For Russian market, however, number of empirical studies 
that examine problem association of IPO performance and features of board of directors is close to 
zero. Even further, there are no empirical papers that focus on difference of performance of companies 
on different stock exchanges. In this regard, Russian market poses additional interest as a significant 
number of companies list their shares abroad. 
Research goal of this master thesis is analyzing relationship between different characteristics 
of board of directors and IPO performance of Russian companies. Even further, factors that affect 
underpricing of Russian companies at different stock exchanges, namely LSE and MOEX/RTS, will 
be compared.  
To achieve aforementioned goals five objectives were formulated: 
1. Conduct a review of theoretical papers on concepts of IPO underpricing and board of directors
of  and empirical researches on relationship between board of directors and  IPO underpricing
or performance;
2. Based on chosen factors develop series of hypothesis and propose relevant methodology for
empirical study;
3. Analyze sample, collect relevant data and describe it;
4. Run an empirical study on a sample of companies to identify relationship between chosen
factors and IPO underpricing;
5. Interpret results of a regression model, make conclusions and formulate managerial
implications of the research.
This thesis consists of introduction, first chapter devoted to theoretical aspects, second chapter
devoted to empirical analysis and conclusion. This master thesis is based on empirical research 
First chapter devoted to explaining concepts behind IPO and IPO underpricing, examining 
peculiarities of Russian IPO market and corporate governance system and review of literature. Review 
of relevant papers is divided into two parts. In first part, review of theoretical papers will be conducted 
in order to determine which characteristics are relevant for this research. In second part, review of 
empirical studies will be conducted and as a result series of hypothesis and research gap will be 
formulated.  
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Second chapter consists of several consecutive parts. Firstly, linear regression model will be 
designed. Next, all necessary data will be hand collected from emission papers, prospectuses and 
annual and quarterly reports and further described. After that, a series of regression models will be 
ran.  All results of regression model will be interpreted and based on this interpretation hypothesis 
will be either rejected or accepted for each of subsamples separately. Results of empirical study will 
be discussed in order to shape research findings and identify managerial implications. In the very final 
part of this thesis, limitations of the paper will be discussed and propositions for future studies will be 
formulated. 
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CHAPTER ONE. THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF IPO UNDERPRCING AND 
BOARD OF DIRECOTRS 
1. IPO underpricing
1.1.1. An IPO process 
The Initial Public Offering reflects the process when shares of the company are presented to 
the public for the first time. According to Russian Law (MOEX, 2015), IPO is a first public placement 
of equity securities through open subscription systems, such as stock exchanges, auctions or (and) 
trade promoters. After the issuing process is complete portion of shares of the company float freely 
on the market and company can be considered publically traded.  
Under usual circumstances there are 4 entities that participate in initial public offering: the 
company that wishes to issue shares, the stock exchange institution, potential investors and investment 
bank. The latter is responsible for underwriting and promoting the deal and calculating price of the 
offer. In addition, banks insure companies from overpricing situation when market believe that share 
is overpriced through buying shares. 
IPO process consists of a number of steps that strictly regulated by government and stock 
exchange. In Russia seller must obtain state registration of securities from the Bank of Russia. State 
registration allows issuing shares both in Russia and on foreign markets, but only under condition, 
that offering meets requirements both of local Law and regulations of stock exchange.  Checking 
whenever the company meets requirements is a role of underwriter – investment bank, which is as 
well conduct audition, legal and due diligence check. During this process, the company must provide 
an information about itself, the corporate governance and the uses of funds raised through public 
offering. Usually companies are not willing to disclose beyond what is required, however firm may 
share additional information with public in order to reduce asymmetry of information and promote 
the deal.  After checking procedures conducted by both bank and legal entities, company can choose 
the specific method of offering. Finally, after company is clear to list a share its promoters and hired 
investment banks advertise shares to investors through special marketing process (“Road Show”) in 
order to evaluate potential demand for the offering. Afterwards, the share is being listed at stock 
exchange at specific prices. Usually the company reserves the right to sell additional amount of shares 
(up to 10%). 
Underwriting bank is also responsible for valuation of stocks and this is extremely important 
process for IPO. In order to maximize value of IPO, the initial price should be as close as possible to 
maximum price the market willing to pay. Usually investment bank makes preliminary valuation and 
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sets a price range for a target share. During marketing and communication of the offer to major 
investors, company’s and bank’s representatives evaluate demand more precisely and gather 
information that can narrow down the price range. As the price, set shares are issued and traded at 
market price, which is out of control of issuing companies. 
Underwriting bank determine price of shares either based on past performance of the company 
and forecast of future performance or on comparing performance of company against market. Neither 
of those methods do not take into account some intrinsic characteristics of company such as quality 
of corporate governance for instance. Those characteristics, however, can be highly evaluated by 
investors and results in higher interest towards IPO and higher first day returns. When pre-IPO 
company is valued wrong, the price of the stock will be different from initial price by the end of the 
first day of sales. If stock had grown in price very rapidly, it means that company gave away part of 
its value for less – this is what called an underpricing. In order to avoid this situation, company must 
pay close attention to valuation processes and reasons why stock may be undervalued in the first place. 
Being an important step in business’s development IPO has several significant disadvantages. 
.Besides obligatory information  disclosure information to public, the IPO process is associated if a 
number of drawbacks, mostly cost-affiliated (PWC,2012) , such as costs of marketing expenses, legal 
and accounting fees, changing of financial reporting system, requirement of new members of board 
of directors, compensation for investment bank services and costs connected with converting firm 
from private organization to private. Despite being very costly, IPO is a very efficient method to raise 
substantial funds. Besides direct impact of attracting money, IPO provides company with a number 
of benefits: 
• Increase in company’s prestige and reputation;
• Listing may be seen as advertising of the company both for clients of the company and
potential investors;
• Post-IPO company usually have access to wider pool of borrowing options and can borrow
at lower rates because potential investors can more easily evaluate risks associated with the
company;
• Value liquidity for shareholders. As company go public, any holder of share or convertible
option can easily turn their security into money, which is serious benefit from investors’
perspective.
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1.1.2. Specifics of Russian IPOs 
Russian IPO market may be called rather small and limited compared to foreign markets. 
Russian companies started actively listing their shares on capital markets in the year 2002. Prior to 
that date  only 6 IPOs can be observed, namely Lukoil, Gazprom, Eurasia Mining and Everfor 
Diamonds, Tatneft(all listed in London) and Vymplecom(Listed on NYSE). Between 2002 and 2017, 
Russian companies did 138 IPOs, which is barely comparable to developed markets. For instance, 
over the same period of time 1779 US companies went public (Harvard, 2017). At the same time, 
Russian companies are making IPO not only on domestic markets, but also overseas. 
Table 1.Overview of Russian companies’ IPOs from 2002 to 2017
Stock Exchange Number of listing Total value of 
offerings, mln USD 
Average value of an 
offering, mln USD 
London Stock 
Exchange(GDR) 
48 34596 720 
London Stock 
Exchange(AIM) 
20 3121 156 
MOEX, RTS 74 37936 512 
Frankfurt Stock Exchange 2 349 116 
NYSE 3 2059 514,7 
NASDAQ 4 41 20,5 
Hong-Kong Stock Exchange 2 2480 1240 
Warsaw Stock Exchange 1 1895 1895 
Vienna Stock Exchange 1 79 79 
Source:Preqveca.ru
In table 1 it is possible to observe total number of IPOs on each stock exchange as well as total 
and average value of offerings. Difference between total number of listings - 155 and total number of 
companies that went IPO – 138 is explained by the fact that 17 companies did double listings. London 
Stock Exchange and London AIM are considered different stock exchanges due to the nature of listed 
companies. London AIM was created to help smaller companies to raise funds and has significantly 
less strict listing requirements.  
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As seen the majority of listings were done either on LSE/LSE AIM or on MOEX/RTS. At the 
same time, average value of a deal on MOEX/RTS and LSE is higher compared to LSE AIM. There 
are several reasons to go public in London (PWC report, 2014): 
• Many of Oil & Gas companies gone public at London and thus LSE was seen as favorable
place for the industry. As first Russian O&G companies that went IPO in London in created 
peer network that made LSE more appealing to Russian Oil&Gas newcomers; 
• London is the world financing capital and the one that has the most sentiment towards
Russian companies. In addition, it is the closes world finance center to Moscow; 
• Listing rules are less strict compared to NASDAQ or NYSE and more favorable to foreign
companies. 
In addition, it is important to  point out that companies representing core sectors such as 
Russian economy such as Oil&Gas, mining, metals, financial services, retail, energy and telecom 
prefer to list their shares either on LSE or on MOEX/RTS. Only 2 large companies from 
aforementioned sectors decided to go public elsewhere. Based on those features of Russian IPOs it is 
obvious that this research should be conducted using companies listed on LSE or MOEX/RTS. 
Figure 1. Number of Russian companies IPOs 
As seen on figure 1, number of Russian companies reached its peak period from 2005 to 2007: 
almost half of IPOs were conducted during those 3 years. Influenced by World Financial Crisis 
number of IPOs decreased in following years, however in 2010 markets started to recovery. During 
recent years only very, few Russian companies went public due to slowing down of Russian economy 
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and sanctions. Despite negative trend there are forecast of increasing of both value and number of 
Russian IPOs (Baker et al., 2015). Moscow Stock Exchange authorities expect surge in number of 
technological companies listings their shares. In addition, several companies initiated IPO process but 
postponed actual listing due to external factors or lack or investors’ interest. 
1.1.3 Theories of an IPO underpricing 
As mentioned before, the major theories describing reasons for IPO underpricing are 
connected to asymmetry of information and behavioral elements of participators. Besides that, 
theories of deliberate underpricing can mentioned. 
With no doubt the most developed theoretical explanation of underpricing is an information 
asymmetry theory. The very basics of this theory (Spence, 1973) were developed during last decades 
up until modern form. The theory is based on an assumption that during IPO one is more informed 
about details of the deal than another one which leads to substantial agency and transaction costs 
(Ljungqvist, 2007).Further there are three situations in which asymmetry can lead to an underpricing: 
• Issuing company have more information than the buying side;
• Underwriter is more informed about market conditions than issuing company;
• Investors are more informed about market conditions that issuing company or underwriter.
First situation is based on assumption that issuer of the stock hide some important inside 
information from investor prior to listing. The major incentive of the company to do so is to signal 
quality of the firm to investors after listing (Ibbotson, 1975). As a stock get underpriced it provides 
investor with higher initial return and thus company is seen as a good investment opportunity by the 
market, which is positive signal for further emissions and fund raising 
Second situation when asymmetry of information occurs is when underwriter is more 
informed about market situation than its client. Based on modern researches, bank can have various 
reasons to do so. Firstly, bank may face agency problem if it serves needs of investor and (Loughran 
& Ritter, 2002) and biased by potential reward commission. In that case, underwriter will deliberately 
lower initial offering to reduce costs for investing party. Besides agency problem, investor can 
misinform underwriter during closer interactions prior to IPO. Investors tend to hide full information 
to lower price of share. Here partial adjustment of the price by underwriter can be seen as a mechanism 
to make investor reveal truthful information. By adjusting price partially underwriter provide investor 
with preference and encourage them to share information (Benvesite et al, 1989) 
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Finally, investor may be more informed about market conditions than issuer, which leads to 
uncertainty for issuing company. Major incentive of investor here is, once again, to lower potential 
price of initial offering through not communicating significant information during communication 
with company’s representatives. 
Behavioral theories support an assumption that the selling side parties, namely seller or 
underwriter intentionally may underprice shares due to some behavioral biases. As mentioned before, 
some companies are  tend to underprice its share to leave better impression on buyer and communicate 
to the market quality of the stock as an investment security. In the same manner, underwriters’ 
incentives to leave favorable impression on investors may be a reason for underpricing. In that case, 
underwriter take advantage of issuing company perception of its own price share through potential 
manipulation with price range or not communicating additional information gathered in the process 
of interactions with investors (Loughran & Ritter, 2002). 
Finally, there are deliberate theories of underpricing. There are two different views on 
deliberate underpricing. The first group of researches argues that underpricing can be a managerial 
tool to keep portion of control over the firm by reducing monitoring of their activities. (Brennan & 
Franks, 1997) argue that underpricing leads to  listing oversubscription and this in its turn leads to 
fragmentation of outside investors and smaller number of larger investors. With less significant 
investors, monitoring of the management is reduced and managers gain more control over the firm. 
The second set of theories is completely opposite to first and argues that managers, as rational subjects, 
will tend to increase monitoring of the firm, as it is beneficial for the firm (Stoughton et al, 1998). The 
best way to increase monitoring of the company is to allocate large portion of companies’ shares to 
several institutional investors because as stake in the company is large enough, investor will tend to 
participate in companies business through monitoring. In that case underpricing can be seen as a 
mechanism to incentivize large investor to buy larger share and thus get higher initial return. 
1.2. Board of directors 
1.2.1. Place of board of directors in corporate governance structure 
Board of directors is a core element of corporate governance mechanism in the company. 
Corporate governance by itself is set of mechanics that control and guide the firm. The whole system 
may be seen as transistor between interests of different stakeholders, such as managing, shareholders, 
employees, board and others(OECD, 2006).Corporate governance structure serves multiple purposes, 
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such as: improvement independent decision making process, providing reliable information about 
position of the company to all stakeholders, reducing agency costs through duality of governance. 
Nowadays, researches tend to split corporate governance system into external and internal 
elements. External elements are mostly referring to market forces that affects decision-making, while 
internal are basically focused around ownership of the company and board of directors.  
There are  4 essential elements to the corporate structure. 
First key body is meeting of shareholders. This is supreme governance unit with minimum 
required meeting of once a year. General meeting of shareholders even though is on the top of 
corporate governance mechanism still has limited ability to implement changes and affect company’s 
strategy. Major decisions made my general meeting include voting for members of board, 
reorganization or liquidations procedures and approval of reports and distribution of free cash 
available to shareholders. 
Board of directors is a corporate governance element that is directly chosen by shareholders 
meeting and represents interests of equity investors. It is a paramount regular governance body. 
According to (FZ N 208 , 2005) director can nominated only by a shareholder or a group of 
shareholders that own more than 2% of voting shares and appointed though general meeting of 
shareholders. This requirement is very similar in different legislation systems all around the World. 
Board of directors does not have direct executive functions but instead set strategy and structure of 
the company, delegate implementation of key decisions to management, control and supervise 
performance of executives of the company. Director may hold an executive position in the company 
and be so called executive directors – however according to Russian law there are some limitations to 
such practice, namely it is forbidden to chairman of board to be Chief Executive Officer at the same 
time. There are 2 types of non-executive directors: namely dependent non-executive directors 
independent non-executive directors, usually called outside directors or simply independent directors. 
Independent director, sometimes called outside director, is a member of a board that has no pecuniary 
relations either with company or any employee or director of the company. Some board of directors 
may have board committees, special bodies that are formed of members of board of directors and are 
responsible for overseeing particular perspective of the company’s business or processes. 
Two last essential elements of corporate governance structure are collegiate executive body 
and single member executive body. Single member executive bodies are chief directors, while 
collegiate executive body is board of top-level managers of the company head by chief executive 
officer of the company. 
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1.2.2. Review of literature on characteristics of board of directors 
This part is going to provide a brief overview of characteristics of board of directors. 
Theoretical basis of each characteristics and its impact on business in order to understand which 
characteristics are relevant for this research and what is their potential effect on IPO performance 
might be will be reviewed.  This review focuses on basic characteristics essential to every board of 
directors since more features that are specific might be non-relevant for this research considering 
rather small expected sample that might lack observations for specific characteristics.  
Board composition 
Based on historical performance of companies it is possible to can say that balance in board 
composition is one the key factors of its effectiveness (Mehorta, 2016). 
Board members can be split into three major categories. First category is executive directors 
also called insiders, such as C-level managers. Second category is related outsiders, usually called 
nonexecutive non independent directors. Those are directors how have family ties with member of a 
board, executives or owners, own share themselves or have past relation with a company, for example 
past position in management. Finally, there are independent directors who have no business or 
personal relations with a company or any person affiliated with a company. 
Board composition can be affected by a number of factors, such as size of a company, 
geographical reach, industry, merger and acquisition activities and growth prospects (Lehn et al, 
2009). In addition to internal factors board composition might be affected by legislation of a country 
or requirements of a stock exchange. 
Most of corporate codes have requirement for board independency to be at least 50%, while 
for in Russian corporate code there is no such requirements. (Heidrick and Struggles, 2007) underline 
that for Russian companies major incentive to include independent directors on board is not to improve 
performance of corporate governance mechanism but to fulfill requirements of stock exchanges in 
spite of future listings. As mentioned in the part devoted to specifics of Russian governance system, 
on average number of independent directors on Russian boards almost twice as low compared to 
European or American boards. In addition, 70% of Russian publicly traded companies have only 
required minimum of independent directors on board (PWC,2012). Considering those facts it is 
obvious that independency of board is the most interesting board composition variable to add to 
conducted analysis. Through analyzing independency of Russian companies’ boards it is possible to 
16 
arrive into conclusion whenever adopting practice of having minimum independent directors is 
beneficial for companies during IPO listing or not. 
Experience 
Experience of directors can be measured in different ways. First approach refers to years of 
experience of a member of board. Experience of director can classified either as industry-relevant 
experience or as other experience. Industry expertise of directors can adjust strategic course of a 
company and help firm make better decisions. Research conducted by (Drobetz, 2016) discovered 
directors with industry related experience boost company value in a long-term perspective and in 
addition help company make better decisions regarding its investments. In addition, experience of 
directors can have even better positive effect in case is if companies’ executives have low expertise 
in industry. In addition to directors with relevant experience, companies tend to appoint to boards 
directors with expertise in other fields. What is observable based on a number of researches is the fact 
of more frequent appointments directors with financial experience. More precisely, companies 
welcome directors with expertise in M&A and post M&A procedures (Kroll et al, 2008) and 
fundraising .The author elaborates that directors with experience in those firms positively affect ability 
of companies to make precise investment decisions, valuate synergies and attract capital. 
Second way to measure experience of directors is through number of ongoing and past 
executive positions. This measure is used a number of empirical studies due to the fact that current 
and past managerial positions are obligatory to reveal in emission papers or reports because this is one 
of the factors that can point to affiliation and dependency of director. 
Tenure 
Tenure is a number of years that director sits on particular board. Higher tenure usually seen 
as a positive factor to company’s performance because higher average tenure leads to better 
cooperation between directors, deeper understanding of business and establishing tight relations with 
stakeholders. Further (Musteen et al, 2010) proved in his research that tenure has non-linear 
relationship with performance. This is explained by several reasons: 
• Higher tenure reduces independency of director. Directors that reached specific tenure1
no longer can be considered as independent;
1 Exact number depends on particular Code of Corporate Conduct 
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• Higher tenure leads to industry-specific biases  that limits decision making;
• Longer presence of director on a board reduces his or her motivation to participate.
Based on specific markets and metrics there is different optimal tenure of director on board. 
Outside directorships 
Outside directorship is directorship held by director of company on another board. (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983) were researching signaling theory and multiple directorships and arrived to results that 
high number of directorships signaling high quality of a firm to investors.(Kaplan an Reihus, 1990; 
Vafeas, 1999) suggest that number of outside directors position held by independent directors can be 
seen as a part of reputation of board. What is interesting, outside directorships held by executive 
compared to non-executive directors can be perceived differently and thus often seen as different 
variables in analysis. (Jiang et al, 2006) in a research on reputation of independent directors argues 
that  outside directorship perceived as a part of reputation of an independent2 director and a affects 
perception of a board by outsiders including investors. Outside directorships held by executives also 
have effect on firm’s business but in another manner. In 2011 research by (Geletkanycz and Boyd, 
2011) was revealed positive impact of number of top executives’ directorships on companies’ long-
term performance. As underlined in the paper outside directorships are beneficial for industry specific 
experience of executives and more beneficial for strategically focused companies compared to 
diversified holdings. Since industrial experience was covered in other variable, this outside 
directorship characteristics should be focused on number of outside directorships held by independent 
directors only. 
Citizenship 
Presence of non-citizens on board can a sign of higher quality of corporate governance in 
particular markets. Reason of this lies in the fact that foreign directors more often perceived as 
independent by the market and add certain degree of diversity to board (Choi et al, 2012). Positive 
effect, however, very dependent on the particular market and on examined dependent variable. 
(Xinqiang et al, 2017) found negative relationship between presence of foreign directors on board and 
earnings of Chinese companies. This brings to conclusion that to build hypotheses on influence of 
foreign directors on IPO performance it is important to carefully examine peculiarities of researched 
market and stock exchanges were companies are listed. 
2 Independent and non-executive directors are considered to be the same thing in reviewed research 
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Gender 
Percent of females on board of directors is a researched topics. Based on markets sample 
higher percent of females has positive or no relationship with general company’s performance 
measured through financial metrics (Ellwood and Garcia-Lacalle, 2018; Green and Colin, 2018). 
Despite the worldwide trend, the percent of females on boards of Russian companies is low and barely 
comparable to figures of developed markets. Only 5,7% of boards members are females compared to 
the Worlds average of 12,7% (Deloitte, 2015). It is important to take into account that women’s 
directorships figure is actually has been growing over the years and  that means that back in the most 
intense IPO period(2005-2007) in the country percent of females on board was even lower. Based on 
this it is possible to predict low number of observations for this variable in collected sample, which 
leads us to necessity of exclusion variable from this research. 
Directors’ Ownership 
 (Espenlaub & Tonks, 1998) had discovered that ownership of shares by directors 
communicates positive signals to investors. Directors are perceived as personas with deep 
understanding of internal processes and companies perspectives and thus ownership by directors 
makes investor more confident about future of the company. It is important, however, to take into 
account specifics of Russian open joint stock companies. As mentioned in the part devoted to 
peculiarities of Russian governance system Russian companies has rather concentrated ownership. 
Based on this fact it is clear that high directors’ ownership might mean presence of beneficial owner 
of the company on board. (Sur et al, 2013) researched different types of directors’ ownerships and 
arrived at result that family/beneficial owner-director has much less positive effect on perception of 
the company by investors. 
1.2.3. Review of studies on relationship between board of directors and performance 
Before moving to empirical part of this thesis existing empirical findings on relationship 
between IPO underpricing and board of directors will be examined. For this, an overview of the key 
findings of papers regarding basic characteristics of board such as experience of directors, 
independency of board, number of directorships, tenure of directorships, ownership concentration and 
number of foreign will be made. Papers that analyze relationship between characteristics of board and 
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general financial metrics as well as papers devoted to problem of IPO performance specifically will 
be taken into consideration. 
Independency 
There are numerous empirical researches devoted to aspect of independency of board and its 
effect on different metrics, sometimes with opposite results. (Rosenstein & Wyatt, 1990) researched 
influence of appointing non-executives on price of shares and found relation to be positive. (Peace, 
1991) conducted a survey to determine strength of board of directors and CEO and its influence on 
financial performance measured by earnings per share metrics. One of variables in research was 
independence of board (as absolute number of independent directors to dependent) which showed 
positive association with financial performance. Follow up researches examined similar relationships 
on various markets (Peng, Buck, Filatotchev,2003; Bhagat, 2008) and arrived to similar results. 
Opposite to mentioned researches, (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1990) found negative relation between 
financial performance and independency using sample of United States traded companies. This 
research, however, discovered that only excessive number of independent director has negative 
association with performance, which can mean non-linear relationship. Similarly to (Agrawal and 
Knoeber, 1990) a number of researches ( Klein, 1998; Bozec, 2005; Christensen, Kent, Stewart, 2010) 
found negative relation between different financial metrics such as return on assets or Tobin 
coefficient and independency. This brings us to assumption that relationship between independency 
of board and performance is dependent on specific markets and can vary based on dependent variable. 
In the very similar manner, relationship between IPO underpricing and board independency 
also happened to be rather controversial according to studies. (Yatim, 2011) discovered positive 
association between 2 mentioned metrics while researching Malaysian market. On the other hand, 
(Kubicek at el, 2016) ran similar research with a sample of 75 central Europeans companies with 
contrary results. According to researchers, there is negative association between IPO performance and 
independency, which is aligned with signaling theory. 
Despite very controversial results of previous empirical studies, it is vital to underline that 
researches of UK market showed positive relationship. Based on this factor following hypotheses can 
be formulated: 
H1 There is a positive relationship between board independency and IPO underpricing of 
Russian companies listed on stock exchange 
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Experience of directors 
Experience of directors proved to have an impact on performance of business. (Moy and Luk, 
2003) arrived at results that lack of experience among executive directors is a serious negative factor 
for growth perspectives of a company.(Kor and Misangyi, 2008) provide empirical evidences that 
experience of directors on board can have positive effect on companies’ profitability. In the research, 
authors focus on young companies with under experienced management and found that high industry 
expertise of directors can compensate lack of relevant managerial experience. Follow up research by 
(Kor and Sundaramurthy, 2009) proved that specific industrial experience of directors indeed has 
positive effect on performance, namely revenue growth.  
As mentioned before, experience of directors can be measured not only through overall age of 
relevant experience but also through number of outside managerial positions, both past and ongoing, 
held by directors. (Falato, Kadyrzhanova, Lel, 2014) underline that outside managerial experience 
have only limited positive effect on a company’s performance. After some point of workload directors 
tend to lower value of a company due to the fact that they cannot pay enough attention to firm’s 
business.  
Empirical studies of relationship between IPO performance and experience of directors 
support findings described above. Executive directors’ experience can arguably have different impact 
on IPO underpricing. From the one side, more experienced directors can provide potential investors 
with more confidence about governing the company and thus increase underpricing as investors will 
attribute more value to the company with better governance. From another side, a higher number of 
outside directorships and managerial positions may be seen as a factor that distorts executive from 
managing the company and thus has negative effect on underpricing. (Howton , 2006) reveals negative 
relationship on IPO underpricing. (Filatotchev and Bishop,2002) researched underpricing on UK 
stock market and took into consideration number of executive position outside the firm as a measure 
of experience and arrived at same results arrived at same results. As their analysis was accompanied 
with low R squared value it is obvious that in this paper concept of experience should be widen  and 
use overall relevant average experience in addition to number of managerial positions. Further, since 
companies traded on Russian Stock market tend to have more executives with cross-managerial 
position in subsidiary firms it can be assumed that negative character of relationship can be relevant 
for both stock exchanges. Based on this factor following hypotheses can be formulated: 
 H2 There is a negative relationship between board experience of directors and IPO 
underpricing of Russian companies listed on stock exchange  
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Tenure 
Tenure is can be a measure of internal connections between members of board. (Fonkilstein 
and Mooney, 2003) use average tenure of director to measure strength on internal ties within a board. 
In addition, there are evidence of impact of tenure on company’s performance. 
Same report discovered that board stability measured as a non-frequent reelections increases 
long-term post-IPO performance. (Howton, 2006) calculated optimal tenure for U.S. companies’ 
boards of 7,38 years and argues that higher tenure is significantly related to a company long-term 
survival and success. (Fisher and Pollock, 2004) researched average tenure of a member of board and 
company’s financial performance measured by accounting metrics. Their research although not very 
explanatory found direct relationship between tenure and financial performance of a company. In 
recent 2017 research (Salancik and Preffer, 2017) conducted a complex research of impact of tenure 
of different categories of directors on various aspects of companies performance.  According to the 
paper, tenure is not related to any financial performance improvements in case if directors hold 
significant portion of shares but if company is controlled externally higher average tenure is beneficial 
for profit margins. In addition, the author found relation between management –controlled companies 
and stock performance. 
Research by (Hesjadel, 2007) was focused specifically on quality of corporate governance and 
IPO underpricing. High average tenure was confirmed to have positive effect on underpricing of initial 
public offering. (Huang et al, 2017) researched IPO performance and characteristics of board with 
regards to Chinese IPO market. This paper once again proved positive effect of tenure but what is 
interesting discovered U-shape relationship between tenure and IPO performance. Those results are 
aligned with discovers of papers reviewed in previous parts that stated that effect of tenure on 
company starts decreasing after specific point in time. Based on aforementioned researches following 
hypotheses can be formulated 
H3a There is a positive relationship between average tenure of director on board and IPO 
underpricing of Russian companies listed on stock exchange 
Outside directorships 
(Cotter et al, 1997) researched relationship between number of outside directorships and M&A 
procedure. According to research’s result if target company high number of outside directorships this 
will results to higher price premium. Authors argue that multiple directorships are seen as a sign of 
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well-established board and give positive signal to acquirer.  (Harris, Shimizu, 2004) researched 
problem of multiple directorships and M&A performance from perspectives of both target and 
acquirer. In M&A deals companies that acquired firms with higher number of multiple directorships 
tend to have higher after-deal profits. (Masulis, Mobbs, 2014) who were researching directorship 
positions of independent directors of American S&P firms arrived to results that companies with 
directors who have outside directorships have higher operational returns as well.  Based on their 
research (Ferris, Jagannathan, Pritchard, 2003) argue that there is strong positive relationship between 
multiple directorships and financial performance. In addition to financial performance, there are 
researches that are focused on market performance. (Omer, Shelley, Tice, 2014) analyzed more than 
4000 companies and found positive relationship between multiple directorships and stock price. From 
another side, some researches argue that excessive number of directorships is a negative factor for 
business. (Fitch, Shivdasani, 2006) made a conclusion that companies with multiple-holding directors 
on board has worse price to book ratio compared to those companies which have no multiple-holding 
directors on board.(Cashman, Gillan, Jun, 2012) analyzed association of multiple directorships and 
market performance measure by Tobin coefficient and discovered relationship to be negative. Authors 
underline that their research is relevant for companies with high market capitalization while for 
smaller firms opposite association is true. 
 Next, it is important to investigate how directorships of independent directors affect IPO 
underpricing of the company. (Certo et al, 2001) researched board reputation, which based on their 
results in lower underpricing of an IPO. Those discovers were later supported by (Cohen & Dean, 
2005) and more recently by (Yatim, 2011).Adopting approach of (Yatim, 2011) who investigated 
factors of IPO underpricing on Malaysian stock market. Thus, it is likely that reputation of 
independent directors is negatively related to IPO underpricing. This argument is supported by 
assumption that firms seek to give a signal about quality of governance through multiple directorships, 
which, in its turn, should reduce underpricing. What is interesting, Russian listed companies tend to 
follow regulations on independent directors less consistently and strictly compared to LSE listed 
companies. This leads us to assumption that companies that go public abroad pay more attention to 
independency of board and its reputation. Given all mentioned following hypotheses can be 
formulated: 
H4a There is a negative relationship between multiple directorships on board and IPO 
underpricing of Russian companies listed on stock exchange  
23 
Citizenship 
A number of studies investigated impact of presence of foreign directors on board and 
performance of a company. (Oxelheim and Randoy, 2003) confirms that there are positive relationship 
between internationalization of board and financial metrics of a company. Those results were later 
confirmed by (Choi et al, 2012) who found similarly strong association on Korean market. According 
to the author, high number of foreign directors boost monitoring and insure investors that board is 
independent. On the other note research by (Masulis, Wang, Xie, 2012) discovered quite the opposite 
results. Based on sample of large the United States companies authors discovered that foreign directors 
have negative association with performance of a company. In addition, high number of foreign 
directors results in higher like hood of financial misreporting. According to research, foreign directors 
tend to attend meetings not as often as domestic ones and pay less attention to director’s duties in non-
domestic companies. Effect of foreign directors varying on the basis whenever market is developed 
or developing. In former intuition of directors is quite advanced and foreign directors do not add value 
while in latter foreign directors can bring valuable expertise and insure investors in independency of 
board. 
(Boulton et al, 2006) researched sample of companies from 26 countries and discovered that 
companies tend to have higher underpricing in cases with internationalized corporate governance 
system. In addition, the author points out that developed countries benefit less from foreign directors 
on board which is aligned with aforementioned works. As  previously mentioned in this thesis, Russian 
governance system is rather undeveloped and thus it is possible to  conclude that foreign directors will 
have positive effect on IPO performance of Russian companies. Unsurprisingly, there is a foreign 
directors on boards internationally listed Russian companies then domestically listed ones. As a result, 
following hypotheses can be formulated: 
H5a There is a positive relationship between number of foreign directors on board and IPO 
underpricing of Russian companies listed on stock exchange  
Ownership 
(Keasy et al, 1993) contrary to previous findings discovered that relationship between director 
ownership and performance measured by return on assets is non-linear. Finds were that association is 
positive until it reaches figure of 68,2% and decreases as ownership approaches 100%. (Bhagat et al, 
1998) researched relation between director ownership and various aspects of business, such as 
performance, CEO turnover and quality of monitoring. All of variables found to have positive 
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correlation with ownership by directors. This research was continued by (Bhagat and Bolton, 2013) 
who developed approach and used dollar-based ownership variable instead of percent. Their empirical 
study found positive relationship between ownership and return on assets on United Kingdom Market. 
While speaking about IPO underpricing specifically there is a research of (Filatotchev and 
Bishop, 2002) who has researched of characteristics of board and IPO underpricing on UK market 
provides us with the fact that directors’ ownership and IPO performance are negatively related. As 
half of collected sample is listed on London Stock Exchange same results for at least half of collected 
sample is expected. Based on this factor following hypotheses can be formulated: 
H6a There is a negative relationship between director’s ownership of shares on and IPO 
underpricing of Russian companies listed on stock exchange 
There is very limited number of empirical evidences regarding problem of relationship of IPO 
underpricing and characteristics of board of directors on Russian stock exchanges and thus in this 
thesis it will be assumed that all of formulated hypothesis are similarly applicable for MOEX/RTS 
and LSE at the same time. 
After reviewing theoretical and empirical literature research gap can be identified more 
precisely.  
Firstly, it clearly can be seen that there is a number of researches devoted to the problem 
relationship between underpricing and characteristics of board in respect to foreign markets. Speaking 
of Russian markets there are works devoted to relationship between board of directors and financial 
performance (for example Berezinets, 2013) on the one hand and papers focused on problem of 
underpricing of Russian companies’ IPO on another (Ivashkovsaya, 2007). However, no empirical 
studies were focused specifically on relationship between board of directors and IPO underpricing of 
Russian companies. Board of directors is proved to have significant impact on IPO by foreign 
researchers and thus Russian companies’ IPOs might be as well affected by characteristics of board. 
Secondly, number of empirical studies devoted to comparing companies of same origin listed 
on different stock markets is close to zero. By conducting comparison between IPO performance it is 
possible can analyze is stock market exchange plays significant role in IPO underpricing or it only 
intrinsic characteristics of a company are relevant. Thus, it might be concluded this matter might 
demands further research. 
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1.2.4. Specifics of Russian corporate governance mechanism 
Russian companies’ governance structure framework is rather young due to the fact that first 
Joint Stock Ventures appeared in Russia only 27 years ago. Because of that, largest Russian companies 
adopt foreign practices. More precisely, Russian governance system has both elements of German-
Japan and Anglo-Saxon corporate governing systems.  
Corporate governance mechanism is shaped by government regulations and corporate codes. 
In respect to Russian companies that are in England and Russia there  3 sources that shape board of 
directors of a public company, namely Russian Code of Corporate Conduct, UK Corporate 
Governance Code and Russian Federal Law number 208 that passed in 1995.Russian law has 
following requirements towards board of directors of a public company: 
Table 2. Board requirements for Russian OJSC 
Requirement 
Type of person allowed to be 
director 
Natural persons only 
General requirements for 
directors 
At least 5 directors  
Not less than 7 directors for company with one thousand voting 
shareholders or more 
Not less than 9 directors for company with ten thousand voting 
shareholders or more 
Election of a member No limit for re-elections 
Person can be nominated only by shareholder or group of 
shareholders that own 2 or more percent of shares 
Director is elected by voting of shareholders on general meeting 
Executive directors Not more than 25% of directors can hold executive positions 
Chief Executive Officer Allowed to be on board of directors 
No duality allowed  
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Next regulatory document to which we can refer is Russian Code of Corporate conduct. This 
document, initially issued in 2002 aimed at improving mechanism of corporate governance in country. 
The major contribution of Code into governing system was through protecting shareholders 
rights, clarifying essential mechanisms and setting requirements for board and thus increasing 
transparency. Further, on, the Code was updated in the year 2014 with active help of MOEX Stock 
Exchange. Changes in Code were mainly connected to position and role of board of directors in system 
of corporate governance and clarifying several important aspects of board. New version of the Code 
adjusted some of definitions regarding board and add few, for example, it defined role and 
responsibilities of particular committees. 
One of the most important contributions of Code of Corporate Conduct is defining 
requirements for independent directors on board. Historically, there were less independent directors 
on board of Russian companies compared to developed markets.  
Even though there are positive shifts in both regulations of Russian corporate governance and 
system itself, there are still a number of serious drawback and flaws that can be attributed to the 
system.  
First problem connected to Russian corporate governance that is important to highlight is 
connected to ownership structure. This both refers to ownership concentrated in hands of so-called 
Financial Industrial Groups and State ownership. 
FIGs rather often own controlling or blocking packages of shares, sometimes via network of 
official non-affiliated entities in order to avoid regulatory procedures. With accordance to 2008 survey 
(HSE, 2008), 39% of companies were affiliated with financial groups. High concentration of 
ownership, especially through non-transparent mechanisms, negatively effects the whole system of 
corporate governance in the company as majority of directors represent interests of single shareholder. 
In addition to companies, being controlled by single entities there is a significant number of 
firms that are state-owned enterprises e.g. companies with at least 50%+ 1 share owned by Russian 
government. Russian government had launched a series of privatization programs that resulted in 
privatization of major Russian energy, oil and gas and banking companies such as Rosneft, VTB, 
Sberbank, RusGidro and others. In addition, government announced future privatizations programs 
and decreasing ownership percent in aforementioned companies but as of now, a lot of Russian MCEs 
are under control of government, which affects it corporate governance structure. With presence of 
government, representatives on board other shareholders might be uncertain about strategic goals of 
27 
the company as government interests are not always aligned with regular investors’ expectations 
(Menozzi and Urtiaga, 2011). 
Next, legislation system of Russian federation provides rather weak protection for minority 
shareholders compared to foreign systems. This might cause lawsuits by minority owner, especially 
by foreign investors. 
The final major problem with corporate governance in Russia is board composition. At the 
moment, board of largest Russian companies define on average only 33% of its directors as 
independent (Russian Association of Independent Directors research, 2015) while in UK this percent 
is 61,4% (UK board Index Survey, 2017). Even further, in Russian practices very often it is rather 
hard to define truly independent director because a lot of non-executive board members have track of 
being affiliated with a company or its representatives sometime in the past. According to MOEX 
requirements, a company is not obliged to announce which director is independent. Contrary to Russia, 
regulatory bodies of UK and other developed markets usually assume that non-executive director is 
independent. Russia has positive tendency of increasing number of independent directors on board 
but it is still not enough to gain full credibility of foreign investors. 
In general, it is correct to say that Russian corporate governance mechanism Is in transaction 
period but slowly moving to international standards (Russian Association of Independent Directors 
research, 2015). Yet, country still has a number of specific features that sets it apart from developed 
economics in terms of corporate governance practices.  
1.3. Summary of chapter 1 
In chapter one brief overview of IPO process, specifics of Russian market of IPO and 
elaborated on different characteristics of board of directors was given. 
The IPO performance is dependent of the process of communication between issuer, 
underwriting bank and institutional investor. IPO underpricing is complex phenomenon that 
influenced by a number of factors. Firstly, the fair price of a company is rather hard to evaluate and 
as mentioned, there is no method that can provide 100% accurate estimation for stock price. Further, 
different agents have different interests in IPO procedure. Management, underwriter, investors and 
owners might have completely different interest in IPO and thus would like to see different initial 
price and different degree of underpricing. Even further, the same stakeholders – for example owners 
– might have different attitude to IPO underpricing. As underlined in part devoted theoretical
background of underpricing in some cases owners want to see higher underpricing because it will give 
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good impression to investors while in another cases owners want to get maximum for listing and thus 
underpricing for them is a sign of lost funds. 
Further, in chapter 1 peculiarities of Russian IPO market were investigated. Based on historical 
overview it was decided to include in collected sample only companies that are listed on London Stock 
Exchange Main and Moscow Stock Exchange/RTS. Those companies represent key sectors of 
Russian economy and on average are bigger than companies listed on other markets. In addition, more 
than 75% of overall listings were made on those two stock exchanges. 
In second part of first chapter specifics of Russian governance, system and explored different 
characteristics of board of directors were examined. 
Russian governance system has been moving to international standard for quite a while but 
still lagging behind based on some aspects. There are significantly lower independent directors and 
females on board compared to the World’s average and to developed markets in particular. In addition, 
ownership concentration in Russia is high and paired with presence of Russian government in 
ownership structure of largest companies. All of those factors might add uncertainty and rise 
additional concerns while making investment decisions. 
Next, theoretical background on different basic characteristics of board to understand which 
of them will be relevant for this research was analyzed. Based on conducted review some 
characteristics were eliminated, such as percent of females on board as they will likely be insignificant 
due to low expected number of observations. 6 characteristics were chosen for future analysis: 
independency of board, number of foreign directors, number of outside directorships, experience of 
directors, average tenure of directors and directors’ ownership. 
 In final part of first chapter literature review was made. Review of empirical studies that are 
focused on relationship between characteristics of board and general performance metrics of the 
company as well as studies that devoted to problem of relationship between board of directors and 
IPO performance specifically was made. As a result of review, a series of hypothesis was formulated. 
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 CHAPTER TWO. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IPO 
UNDERPRICNG AND CHARACTERSITICS OF BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF RUSSIAN 
COMPANIES         
 2.1. Methodology 
Figure two shows empirical research framework developed for this thesis. 
 
Due the nature of research question that was raised in this thesis, chosen method of analysis is 
linear regression. Further, comparison of means analysis will be used in order to answer second 
research question of this paper. Similar research method was used in a number empirical papers 
reviewed in chapter 1.  
IPO market overview in Russia 
Choice of particular stock exchanges 
Theoretical and empirical literature 
review 
Specific characteristics are chosen 
Hypothesis formulation 
Data collection 
Data description 
Model designing 
Variables description 
Linear regression model 
Comparison of different stock exchanges subsamples results 
Results discussion 
Figure 2. Research methodology 
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2.2. Regression model and variables 
If a stock after first day of trades is priced below initial price of offerings it is considered 
underpriced. Based on previous empiric papers (Certo, 2001; Loughran et al, 2016) underpricing can 
be determined as percentage difference between closing price of a stock at the end of day one and 
initial offering price of the stock divided by initial price: 
𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑖 =
𝑃1− 𝑃0
𝑃0
  ,                                                                    (1)
 where: 
 𝑃1 Is a closing price after first day of trading 
𝑃0 Is the offering price at the moment of issuing 
The econometric model was built in order to check hypothesizes and was designed in the 
following way: 
𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑖𝛽1 + 𝐵𝐴𝑆𝐸𝑖𝛽2 + 𝜀𝑖 ,  (2) 
 where: 
i is a subscript referring to particular IPO 
𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑖 is a dependent variable referring to IPO underpricing percent 
𝛼𝑖 is constant term 
BOARD is a vector describing characteristics of board of directors of the company 
BASE is a vector describing general characteristics of the company 
𝛽 are vectors of unknown parameters 
𝜀 is a error term 
To check formulated hypothesis a number of control variables that were used in studies that 
are more traditional devoted to an IPO underpricing were added. 
In the table 3 summarized names and description of variables can be found 
Table 3. Regression model variables 
Name of the variable Definition 
Dependent variable 
IPO Percent of IPO underpricing 
Independent variables describing board characteristics 
INDEPENDENT Board independence as a percent of independent 
directors on board 
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TENUREAV Average tenure of director on board of directors 
TENURESQ Squared average tenure of director on board of 
directors. This variable is used to check whenever there 
is non-linear relationship between tenure and dependent 
variable. 
FOREIGN Share of foreign directors on board of directors 
EXECEXP An average number of CEO’s (if CEO is 
presented on board) and other executives’ directorships 
and managerial positions. This refers both to position as 
an IPO proceeded and position that were held 5 years 
prior to an IPO 
EXECEXPSQ Squared average number of executives position 
EXPERIENCE Average years of relevant experience of 
directors. This refers both to industry specific 
experience and non-industry specific but related 
experience (E.g. financial experience, restructuration 
experience etc.) 
MULTDIR A total number of outside directorship positions 
that independent directors hold  
OWNERSHIP Percent of shares held by chairman of board and 
rest of board 
Independent variables describing general characteristics of the company 
AGE Age of the company, calculated as number of 
years between foundation and IPO 
AGESQ Squared age of the company 
ROA Return on assets, calculated as ration between 
earnings of the company and book value of assets 
LNSIZE Natural logarithm of size of a company at the 
moment of an IPO. Size of a company determined as 
total assets on balance. 
LEVERAGE Interest bearing debt to equity ratio of the 
company 
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BOARDSIZE Total number of persons on board of directors 
While researching influence of board of directors, the traditional view on the IPO underpricing 
has to be taken into consideration in the current study. With accordance to a numerous empirical 
studies conducted by (Ljungqvist, 2007; Ritter & Welch, 2002; Ritter, 2011) it is correct can say that  
IPO underpricing positively associated with historical financial metrics, size, debt to equity ratio as 
well as age of the company. Most frequently used and well-developed relevant variables will be 
overviewed in order to include them into control vector of b model. Besides choice of variables, it is 
crucial to elaborate on signs of chosen variables.  
Firstly, age can be predicted to have negative relationship with initial public offering 
underpricing. Basis for such relation is the fact that well-established companies provide more 
available information about their business to general public. With more information that is available 
potential stock buyers can better assess company and thus have lower levels of uncertainty about 
offering which in its turn leads to lower deviation of underpricing from initial offering price.  Similar 
logic can be applied to capitalization variable. Huge companies usually have more regulated and 
structured reporting and in general more transparent compared to their smaller counterparts. In 
addition, generally smaller companies lack access to most reputable bank underwriters who are 
responsible for actual valuation of the company. Based on this, it is correct to say that size of the 
company represented by total assets has negative effect on IPO underpricing. 
Next, debt to equity ratio is also predicted to have negative relationship with underpricing. 
Higher DE ratio (also called financial leverage) means that company finance its business more through 
interest bearing debt than equity. (Drucker & Puri, 2005) argue that companies that issued significant 
amount of financial debt instruments have established relationship with underwriting banks and 
investors. Moreover, if company has higher debt it is might be assumed that company is already 
positively assessed by debt investors.  
Finally, according to a numerous studies (for example Mahatidana, 2017) return on asset 
should have positive association with IPO underpricing. Probable explanation for this phenomenon is 
that companies with higher returns naturally attracts attention of investors whom in their turn assign 
higher value to the company with high return on assets. 
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2.3. Data sample 
For this study data of 100 Russian companies that went IPO between 2002 and 2017. Was 
collected. Sample is started with RBC media IPO and finalized my EN+ IPO in 2017.All companies 
presented in the sample were split into two subsamples – companies that went IPO on London Stock 
Exchange or companies that went IPO on Moscow Stock Exchange/RTS. Companies that made 
double listing and went IPO both in Russia and Great Britain were distributed to certain sample based 
on either offering of shares at respective stock exchanges(if this information available) or volume of 
trades during day one. Some of the companies listed on MOEX/RTS were excluded from an initial 
sample due to either absence of appointed directors in emission papers or due to the fact that there 
was a significant gap between publishing of emission prospectuses were and actual IPO.  In total, 
there are 48 companies attributed to London Stock Exchange and 52 to Moscow Stock Exchange and 
RTS. Full list of the companies can be found in appendix 1. 
The list of initial public offerings was obtained from Zephyr database and further double 
verified with SPARK database. All variables were collected by hand from IPO emission papers, 
prospectuses, reports on the results of the offering and annual or quarterly reports. 
Most of variables such as size of board, number of foreign directors, number of outside 
directorships and all control variables except for market capitalization extracted directly from 
companies prospectuses or emission papers. At the same time, number of independent directors was 
not clearly stated in emission papers, especially with regards to papers issued for Russian listings. 
Even further, in some cases directors named independent by the company happened to have some 
affiliations with the firm. Those cases demanded in depth analysis to identify whenever director is 
truly independent or just non-executive dependent director. To conduct such investigation we relied 
on Code of Corporate Conduct of the year 2002 for period from 2002 to 2015 and Code of Corporate 
Conduct 2013 for period from 2013 to 2017 with regards to Russian capital markets and on UK 
Corporate Governance Code for Great Britain capital markets. The algorithm of determining 
independency of directors is based on (Muravyev et al, 2014) research with some minor changes 
suitable for UK markets and can be found in appendix 4. 
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Figure 3. Observations by sectors, London Stock Exchange 
Figure 4. Observations by sectors, Moscow Stock Exchange and RTS 
As seen on figures 3 and 4 different stock exchanges attract different companies. All of 
companies of Oil and Gas sector prefer to list their shares in Great Britain. In addition, a lot of metal 
and mining firms keen on England capital markets. There can be 2 reasons of that phenomenon: firstly, 
effect of peer companies listed on particular stock exchange that attracts companies from same 
industry. This effect was described in details in previous chapters. Secondly, Oil, Gas and Metal 
companies are usually large entities that seek to attract capital in significant volumes and different 
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forms, including bond emissions and see international placement as a better basis for future capital 
rising. 
Speaking of Russian capital markets there are more companies from financial, food and energy 
sectors. Majority of energy companies were created during reformation of RAO ES company, serve 
specific region and has presence of Russian government in their ownership structure and board, which 
makes those companies more suitable to be listed in Russia. Speaking of Russian food companies that 
went IPO domestically majority of them are relatively small and thus do not meet criteria of 
international markets. 
Figure 5.Number of IPOs each year 
As can be seen from figure 5 number of IPOs placed in London and Moscow peaked in 
period from 2005 to 2007 when significant number of largest Russian companies gone public. 
World Financial Crisis can explain dramatic fall of activity in capital markets that followed those 
years. After 2 years of depression markets started to recovery, but after the year 2013 there was 
rather low activity on London Stock Exchange, limited by one listing per year at most. This can be 
partially explained by either downturn in Russian economy or by the fact that the majority of oil, 
gas, metal or mining companies already went IPO in prior years. In general, trends are very similar 
to those presented in figure 1 in the first chapter. The difference is that during recent years Russian 
companies go public almost exclusively on MOEX contrary to previous years. 
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Figure 6. Total market capitalization of companies that went public each year (bln USD) 
Similarly, to number of IPOs, total market capitalization of newly public companies reached 
its maximum in 2006 and 2007. This was fueled by listing of Russian giants from oil&gas, energy 
and metals sectors and Russian largest banks. As seen on the figure 6 after 2014 volume of market 
capitalization decreased significantly and inproportionally to the number of IPOs. That can be 
explained by the fact that very few large companies offered their shares to public after 2014 while a 
lot of local Russian firms of relatively small size were listed in Moscow. 
2.4. Descriptive statistics 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics of board 
LSE MSE\RTS 
Variable Average Dev Min Max Average Dev Min Max 
Size of board 9 2,6 5 19 8 3 4 19 
Non Executives 7 2,1 3 11 6 1,5 3 13 
Executives 2 2,06 0 10 2 1,3 0 7 
Independent 3 1,3 1 6 2 1,5 0 5 
Foreign Directors 3 1,7 0 6 1 1,4 0 5 
In table 4 differences in board structures of the companies listed on different stock markets
can be observed. Size of board is on average larger for LSE-listed companies, which can be explained 
by the fact that on average London-listed companies are larger and have more complex ownership 
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structure, which requires more members on board with accordance to listing regulations. One of 
MOEX companies is not meeting requirements on minimum number of board of directors of 5 people 
and some of MOEX companies have not formed board of directors prior to IPO and thus were 
excluded from the sample. 
As expected, LSE-listed companies have more non-executive and independent directors on 
average. 5 London-traded companies had less independent members on board then required 3 while 
10 of Russian-listed companies do not have independent directors at all and 8 have less than required 
minimum. It is important to mention that number of reported by company independent directors and 
actual independent directors may differ due to the fact that algorithm based on corporate code of 
2002/2012 to identify truly independent director was used. 
In addition, it is not surprisingly that Moscow-listed companies have much less foreign 
directors on board. In fact, 34 of 52 companies do not have any foreign directors on board, while for 
LSE companies this is true only for 8 firms out of 48.  
Table 5.Variables descriptive statistics 
Variable LSE MOEX/RTS 
Average Dev Min Max Average Dev Min Max 
Dependent variable 
Underpricing 0,019 0,11 -0,49 0,21 0,018 0,95 -0,28 0,39 
Independent Variables 
Variables that are part of BOARD vector 
TENUREAV 2,41 1,35 0,6 7,27 2,89 2,05 0,6 11,24 
EXECEXP 2,32 2,52 0 9 3 3,8 0 19 
MULTDIR 11,5 8,39 0 40 7,8 8,9 0 37 
EXPERIENCE 12,6 5 4,2 29 11,5 3,4 5,2 20,1 
OWNERSHIP 0,27 0,32 0 0,89 0,24 0,27 0 0,9 
Variables that are part of BASE vector 
3 Minimal number of independent directors is 2 both for Russian and England stock markets 
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AGE 10,47 5,13 21 1 11,9 6,2 1 24 
SIZE 4378,8 9220 3 52403 3652 12728 2,12 89551 
LEVERAGE 2,03 2,07 0,01 7,29 2,38 2,24 0,12 11,2 
ROA 0,048 0,16 0,3 -0,89 0,09 0,14 0,84 -0,01 
Table 5 represents descriptive statistics for all variables (except for portion of independent
and foreign directors, this variable was discussed above) used in regression models. It can be seen 
can see that Russian companies on average are not heavily underpriced both on LSE and MOEX 
with values of 1, 9 and 1, 8 percent respectively. However, it is important to underline that standard 
deviation on LSE is significantly lower and thus companies’ IPO performance on average is less 
volatile. Some extreme values of underpricing by 39% and overpricing by 49% can be seen but 
observations like this are quite rare to the sample. 
Figure 7. IPO underpricing each year 
Figure 7 provides visualization of   IPO underpricing with scatterplot graph. As seen on the
graph after 2013 there was much less deviations from an average values. It is possible to assume that 
it is because of the nature of recent IPOs, which generate less attention and valued lower. In addition, 
it is interesting that levels of underpricing of Russian companies are very small compared to 
development markets, such as US (16, 2%), Korea (64, 2%) or Honk-Kong (21%). In general, there 
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are low levels of underpricing at specific developing markets such as Argentina or Turkey with 
relatively high level of development uncertainty. Some of values can be seen as outliers however this 
is only due to the nature of Russian IPO market, which has abnormally low first-days returns. High 
and low, figures of first day IPO performance are much more common for U.S., China or European 
market. On top of that, a great number of companies in the sample belong to Oil&Gas, energy, 
industrials and mining industries that naturally have lower underpricing . Given all of that, it is rational 
to assume that observations with extreme values belong to industries more tended to be underpriced 
and thus cannot be seen as outliers. 
What is also interesting is that LSE-based listings  tend to have more outside directorships by 
independent directors.   As already discussed London listed companies pay more attention to structure 
of board in terms of presence of independent directors and their experience. 
In addition, as can be seen in the table return on assets on MOEX listed companies almost as 
twice as high compared to LSE companies with less extreme values and less standard deviation 
The rest of the variables are   relatively similar between two stock markets. 
2.5. Regression analysis results 
Prior to running regression model correlation analysis might be conducted in order to get 
helpful insights.  
Correlation matrix for LSE subsample (Appendix 1) supports some of formulated hypothesis. 
There is strong correlation between share of foreign directors and underpricing as well as between 
average tenure and underpricing. Both of those relations are expected by review of empirical studies. 
In addition, there is strong negative correlation between number of executive positions and 
underpricing which is also aligned with stated hypotheses.  
Directors’ ownership and multiple directorships have rather weak correlation with 
underpricing and an opposite sign of what is expected. 
Besides correlation between underpricing and independent variables. In addition, there are 
several interesting findings. Firstly, share of foreign directors has positive correlation with average 
experience and strong negative correlation with executive positions. It might be assumed that foreign 
directors are on average more experienced than domestics are ones, which is aligned with theoretical 
findings. At the same time, foreign directors do not tend to have additional executive position. Another 
observation that can be made is that size of a board correlated with overall number of directors 
positions held by independent directors.  
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MOEX subsample also has strong negative correlation of underpricing and number of 
executive positions. What is surprising there is actually negative correlation of underpricing and 
average tenure and positive correlation of average experience and underpricing. Both of those 
observations are against stated hypotheses. Correlation of share of foreign directors and underpricing 
is although positive yet significantly lower compared to LSE sample.  
Most importantly, both correlation matrix do not show any significant correlation between 
independent variables. This means that in further linear regression all variables could be used in same 
model. 
Even though correlation matrix provides some useful insights about researched characteristics, 
more advanced methods should be used to check actual significance. 
To conduct statistical analysis STATA 14 software was used. Regression analysis was 
performed with 2 models for each subsample. Since in this analysis there are 2 hypotheses that are 
considering non-linear regression  there are 2 squared BOARD-vector variables. In addition, there is 
1 squared variable in BASE-vector. To determine whenever those variables have non-linear 
relationship with dependent variable it is necessary should run a model with non-squared variables. 
First model takes into account only linear relationship between variables. If linear relationship for 
variable is significant, then squared variable is added to model 2 to check for non-linear relationship. 
Also at first model with all control variables separately was ran but only few were significant. Final 
regression was performed with significant control variables only. 
Table  7 shows statistical results of analysis for LSE and MOEX listed companies.
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Table 6.Regression model results
Variable IPO Underpricing 
LSE MODEL MOEX/RTS MODEL 
Linear*** Squared*** Linear*** Squared*** 
LEVERAGE -0,013** -0,013** -0,01* -0,07* 
LNSIZE 0,010* 0,12* 0,005 0,003* 
BOARDSIZE 0,004 0,008 0,001 0,002 
INDEPNDENT 0,1  0,12 -0,028 -0,055 
FOREIGN 0,024** 0,02** -0,02 -0,05 
TENUREAV 0,03** 0,03*** -0,01* 0,009*** 
TENURESQ -0,0012*** -0,001*** 
EXECEXP -0,001 0,001 -0,002 -0,005 
EXPERIENCE -0,004* -0,005* 0,006** 0,003* 
MULTDIR -0,002* -0,003** 0,002 0,003 
OWNERSHIP 0,01 0,01 -0,05 -0,06 
Cons -0,248 -0,293 -0,04 -0,044 
R^2 adjusted 0,449 0,529 0,475 0,62 
Notes: 
***denotes significance at 0,01 level 
,**denotes significance at 0,05 level, 
*denotes significance at 0,1 level
All 4 models in table 6 are significant with p value less than 1%. Models have rather high 
explanatory power. Linear relationship models have explanatory power of 0,45 and 0,47 for LSE and 
MOEX samples respectively while non-linear R-square is even higher and reach 0,53 for LSE sample 
and 0,62 for MOEX sample. This means that at least 45% of IPO underpricing can be explained with 
conducted analysis. 
Variable INDPENDENT that represent percent of independent directors on board has very 
high coefficient for LSE sample models and rather high yet negative coefficient for MOEX models. 
P-value of this variable, however, varying from 0, 19 to 0, 27 depending on the model, which means 
that results are insignificant. This means that no evidence to prove or reject Hypotheses 1 in respect 
to both stock exchanges were found. 
Next variable, FOREIGN which refers to a share of foreign directors on board provided us 
with rather controversial results. For Russian companies listed in London share of foreign directors 
have positive with IPO performance of the company. In both models, FOREIGN variable is significant 
at 5%. According to results, regression coefficient for squared relationship model is 0, 02 which means 
that for each additional foreign director on board IPO underpricing will increase by 2%. This is rather 
strong link given that average IPO underpricing on LSE is beyond 2%. This finding allows us to accept 
Hypotheses 5 for LSE subsample. In case of MOEX/RTS sample, however, variable showed no 
significant relation to IPO performance and thus Hypotheses 5 cannot be accepted or rejected for 
aforementioned sample. Elaboration on reasons of different significant of FOREIGN variable will be 
continued further in this thesis. 
TENUREAV was the only of tested variables with non-linear relationship that proved to 
significant. All of four models resulted in significance of this variable at 1%. What came in surprise 
is negative relationship of tenure and underpricing in case of linear-relationship MOEX model, but in 
nonlinear relationship model variable showed positive association. Regression coefficient for LSE 
subsample is times higher compared to MOEX/RTS subsample according to regression results. In 
order to understand whenever there is real difference it is necessary to compare results of both models 
in the next part. In addition, optimal tenure for 2 subsamples was calculated to be approximately 
around 5 years. Based on aforementioned results hypothesis 3 is accepted for both of samples 
Experience variables provided us with controversial results. First thing, that need to be 
mentioned is that number of executive positions per executive director has no significant effect on 
IPO underpricing in every model previously tested. Next, variable EXPERIENCE that is calculated 
as average relevant experience per director is significant at 10% level at every model. However, what 
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is interesting sign of association is different based on samples. Therefore, in LSE sample experience 
of directors has negative relationship with IPO underpricing which proves hypotheses 2 in regard to 
LSE subsample. MOEX sample case is the opposite, since as can be observed there is 0,3% positive 
relationship between experience of directors and IPO performance which leads to rejection of 
hypotheses 2. Difference in results for 2 subsamples will be elaborated on in discussion of results part 
of the thesis. 
Multiple directorship variable is significant only in respect to LSE subsample. There is -0,003 
relationship significant at 5% level, which is quite high taking into account nature of the variable. 
That means that each additional outside directorship held by independent director decrease IPO 
performance by 0,3%. Those results are rather surprising considering that correlation between 
INDDIR and UNDERPRICING variables are positive on correlation matrix. Results of conducted 
model proves Hypothesis 4 for LSE subsample and cannot provide enough evidence to prove or reject 
Hypotheses 4 in respect to MOEX subsample since MULTDIR variable showed no significant 
association with dependent variable in MOEX models. 
Finally, no evidence were found that director’s ownership has any relationship with IPO 
underpricing of Russian companies. In all models, OWNERSHIP variable was not significant at any 
level. 
In the table below, results of conducted models are summarized. 
Table 7.Regression model results 
Hypotheses LSE subsample MOEX subsample 
Board independency positively associated 
with underpricing    
No significant results No significant results 
Directors’ experience negatively associated 
with underpricing    
Accepted Rejected 
Average tenure positively associated with 
underpricing    
Accepted Accepted 
Multiple directorships negatively associated 
with underpricing    
Accepted No significant results 
Share of foreign directors positively associated 
with underpricing    
Accepted No significant results 
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Directors’ ownership negatively associated 
with underpricing    
No significant results No significant results 
Next step is to compare variables that confirmed to have significant relationship with 
underpricing on both subsamples to determine whenever there is a statistical difference between two 
stock exchanges regarding influence of specific characteristics, namely average tenure and experience 
of directors. 
Table 8.Hypopthesis summary 
Variable LSE model results MOEX model results Level of significance 
TENURE 0,03 0,009 Prob>Chi2 = 0,092* 
EXEPERIENC -0,005 -0,003   Prob>Chi2 = 0,097* 
As can be seen can see from table 9 both variables show significantly different results for
LSE and MOEX subsamples. 
2.6. Discussion of results 
Based on conducted empirical analysis 4 key findings were discovered. Models show that 
share of foreign directors relatively strongly and positively linked to underpricing of companies listed 
on LSE. Next, average tenure of director on board also has positive association with underpricing and 
this relationship is found to be stronger on LSE compared to MOEX/RTS. Third finding that had been 
made is that experience of executives counted as number of ongoing and past positions tend to have 
negative association with IPO underpricing on LSE but positive on MOEX. Finally, it was discovered 
that total number of outside directorships held by independent directors positively linked to 
underpricing in cases on LSE 
Finding 1. There is positive association of share of foreign directors and IPO 
underpricing of a Russian company listed on LSE. This research arrived at same results as 
(Boulton, 2006); however, it is possible to argue that explanation for the same phenomena will be not 
similar to the one that provided in aforementioned paper. Based on Boulton findings international 
governance has positive effect on IPO underpricing because conditions provided by regulators favors 
to foreigners and empower them to boost value of a company as perceived by investors. In case of 
London-listed Russian companies we can say, however, that foreign directors might be seen as 
guarantee of independency of a board, especially considering the fact that London listed companies 
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are very often beneficially controlled by single person or affiliated group of people – as mentioned 
before an average share of largest preIPO shareholder of a company listed on LSE is just below 50%. 
Finding 2. Tenure is positively and non-linear associated with IPO underpricing on both 
stock exchanges; association stronger on LSE. This research confirmed finding of (Hesjadel, 2007) 
that average tenure of director on board is positively linked to IPO underpricing. Russian companies 
very often have directors with low tenure as proved by descriptive statistics of chosen variables. Even 
further, 18 companies of 100 have average tenure of one year or less. Positive relationship of tenure 
and underpricing might be caused by the fact that investors are more favorable to companies, which 
have board that has been governed by same people at least several years. 
Finding 3.There is negative association of experience of directors and IPO underpricing 
observed in LSE subsample; there is positive association of experience of directors and IPO 
underpricing observed in MOEX subsample. This finding supports studies of (Yatim, 2011) and 
(Mnif, 2009) but relation of experience in case of this thesis is much less. There are several reasons 
why there is negative relation of experience to underpricing. Firstly, it can argued that more experience 
of executive directors help company to more precisely valuate price of a company and set adequate 
price for the share. Secondly, as aligned with (Yatim, 2011) it is correct to say that high managerial 
workload of directors reduces value of a company in eyes of investors and thus they are less willing 
to give higher price at the end of the first day of trades. What is interesting here is that relationship 
between experience and underpricing is actually positive on MOEX stock exchange. Even further, 
association is rather strong. Probably Russian investors welcome experienced directors and willing to 
attribute higher value to companies with experienced boards. 
Finding 4. There is a negative association between number of outside directorships held 
by independent directors of LSE-listed companies and IPO underpricing. Aligned to results of 
(Filatotchev and Bishop, 2002) this research proved that independent directorships are negatively 
relied to underpricing.  This thesis, however, discovered rather weak association and this finding 
requires additional research, especially with regards to England Capital markets, which were 
examined by (Filatotchev and Bishop, 2002). First explanation is that a great number of outside 
directorship results in decreasing number of attention that independent director can pay to specific 
company. As independent directors are major tool of monitoring of company’s performance decrease 
in their attention or attendance decrease certainty of investors about ability of a board to monitor 
performance. This assumption is supported by findings of (Cashman et al, 2012) who found that busy 
directors with a high number of duties are not paying enough attention to each held directorship. 
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Second reason might be in conflict of interests of directors. (Devos et al, 2009) examined this issue 
and discovered in some cases multiple directorship can bias behavior of director and turn it to self-
serving. Research was focused on companies in M&A process and found that if director sits on boards 
of both acquire and target company he can act in its own interests. 
Finally, it is important to underline that there is significant difference between MOEX/RTS 
and LSE subsamples in terms of factors affecting IPO performance. Results of companies listed on 
LSE are much more aligned with results of reviewed empirical studies. Probably, this is because 
investors who buy stocks on LSE pay attention to same features of board of directors disregarding 
country of origin of a company. MOEX listed companies, however, require more research since no 
evidence were found to accept or reject 4 out of 6 of formulated hypothesis in respect to this 
subsample. 
2.7. Managerial implications 
There are 2 perspectives of managerial implications for this research’s results. IPO process 
involves company as selling side and investors as buying side and both of those agents are interested 
in potential underpricing. 
For an investor IPO predicting IPO underpricing means first-day positive return. If a 
company’s initial price is lower than its fair value or at least value, which can be expected after first 
day of trades investor might have additional interest in the deal. Based on conducted empirical analysis 
investors whom are focused on higher short and mid-term returns should pay more attention to: 
• Russian companies with optimal average tenure of director on board. In analysis has been
calculated optimal tenure of  around 5 years but this matter requires further investigation; 
• Russian companies with higher percent of foreign directors on board of directors. This is
relevant only for companies that are going public on London Stock Exchange; 
• Russian companies which directors have less outside directorships on average. This is
relevant only for companies that are going public on London Stock Exchange; 
• Russian companies that go public on MOEX/RTS and have more experienced directors.
Company’ perspective is more complicated though. As was mentioned in part devoted to 
theoretical background of underpricing company can have different attitude towards underpricing. If 
a company wants to make a positive impression on investors through high, first day returns it might 
be suggested to follow recommendation similar to those highlighted above: appoint less loaded 
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directors (opposite is true for MOEX companies), monitor tenure of directors and increase share of 
foreign directors on board prior to an IPO. On the other hand, value of initial price of a share calculated 
based on forecast performance or market comparable. However, companies can charge premium if 
their business has characteristics that can affect business in long-term. If a company already have 
board with aforementioned characteristics then it is possible to use it as leverage to justify premium 
to initial price during IPO process. 
2.8. Limitations of thesis and suggestion for further research 
This thesis was focused on determining which factors affect IPO performance of Russian 
companies on different stock exchanges. Obtained results answer initial research question and 
conducted analysis clearly have some managerial implications. Despite that, there are several 
limitations to this paper, which could be considered in future works. 
Firstly, sample of this study is rather limited. It examines 48 and 52 companies listed on LSE 
and MOEX/RTS respectively. This limitation is caused by the fact there was limited number of IPOs 
of Russian companies during observed period. Due to size of the sample, this research lacked several 
variables such as females on board (this was caused by low number of observations). In addition, it 
was not possible to split sample by industries to use sectors as dummy variables. Extension of sample 
is complicated but manageable objective. In further studies researches can focus on single stock 
exchange instead of collecting single-country sample and compare performance of companies from 
different countries(For example countries from Commonwealth of Independent States) or different 
industries and analyze how impact of characteristics differs on mentioned basis.  
Next limitation is data collection and set of variables. Even though this researched was focused 
on most basic variables that are frequent to similar studies there are more characteristics that could be 
researched. Such features as educational background, government ties, external connection, reputation 
variables and many more can be researched in further works. The problem here is process of data 
collection. All data in this study was hand collected from emission papers and reports. There is limited 
amount of information in those source and collecting of any additional characteristics require 
additional research of directors biographies. In addition, some of characteristics used in this thesis can 
measured differently or categorized in different way. For example relevant experience of directors can 
be split into industry related and non-industry related to analyze which background of directors is 
most beneficial for IPO performance. As was highlighted in discussion of results this is especially 
relevant for companies listed on Russian stock exchanges. In this research were examined mostly 
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factors that are relevant for developed markets and only 2 of them were significant for Russian stock 
exchanges. Therefore there might be country-specific characteristics that were not taken into account 
in this research. 
Finally, majority of control variables were found to be insignificant. In addition, significant 
control variables had rather low level of significance and had relatively low relationship with IPO 
underpricing. For future researches suggested to precisely analyze relevant empirical studies of 
Russian IPO underpricing to identify more explanatory control variables and thus improve model used 
in this research. 
2.9. Summary of Chapter 2 
In this chapter of the thesis, empirical study, which examined relationship between different 
characteristics of board of directors and performance of IPO of Russian companies in period from 
2002 to 2017, was made. 
Based on hypothesis formulated in chapter one was determined set of variables that should be 
examined in this research. To research independency of board, percent of independent directors on 
board was used. To determine experience of directors average relevant experience of directors and 
number of managerial positions held by executives were used. Multiple directorships variable was 
defined as a total number of outside directors’ positions held by nonexecutive independent directors. 
The rest of variable’s were determined in a very straightforward fay – tenure was calculated was 
average tenure per director, ownership as total percent of shares held by directors, and foreign 
presence as a share of foreign directors on board. All of those approaches were previously used in 
empirical studies devoted to board of directors. 
For analysis, data of 100 Russian publicly traded companies was collected and further spilt 
into 2 subsamples. 17 companies that made double listing were attributed based on size of offering on 
particular stock exchange and volume of first day trades. 52 companies comprise MOEX/RTS 
subsample and 48 LSE subsample. 
To run analysis liner regression with two vectors was used: BOARD vector for characteristics 
of board of directors and BASE vector for general characteristics of a company. IPO underpricing 
calculated as difference between initial price and first-day close price divided by initial price was 
dependent variable. For each subsample 2 models were run, first with original variables and second 
with squared tenure variable to check non-linear relationship. Further results of models of different 
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subsamples were compared to determine whenever there is a difference between relationships of 
different characteristics on IPO underpricing based on different stock exchanges. 
4 hypothesis for LSE subsample were accepted. IPO underpricing has positive relationship 
with tenure and share of foreign directors and negative association with experience and number of 
outside directorships. Results for MOEX/RTS subsample are less expected. Only single hypothesis 
that refers to positive association between underpricing and tenure was accepted. Surprisingly, there 
is a positive relationship between IPO results and experience, which led us to rejection of hypotheses 
2b.Also, two variables that have results significant for both subsamples (tenure and experience) were 
compared and it was discovered that they are statistically different. No significant results were found 
for relationship between underpricing and directors’ ownership and independency of board.  In 
general, findings of reviewed empirical studies are more aligned with results of this thesis regarding 
LSE subsample. This comes in no surprise because a lot of empirical researches that were used to 
build hypothesis were focused on developed stock markets, namely United Kingdom and Europe. 
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Conclusion 
The IPO underpricing is a complex phenomenon which is important both to internal 
stakeholders of the company and potential investors. Traditionally, IPO underpricing linked with 
metrics of financial performance of the company. At the same time, there are a number of papers that 
research influence of board of directors of Russian companies and specific financial metrics such as 
profitability, dividend payout or return on assets. 
This research had goal of analyzing influence relationship of characteristics of board of 
directors on IPO underpricing. In the thesis different approaches towards concepts of underpricing 
and board of directors were adopted and further it was examined how different characteristics of board 
of directors affect underpricing of initial public offering. Moreover, it was  examined how influence 
of characteristics differs based on which stock exchange Russian company goes public. To check if 
there are difference between foreign and domestic listings data from companies that did IPO on 
Moscow Stock Exchange or RTS and on London Stock Exchange since latter historically had most 
number of foreign listing of Russian companies was collected. All data used in research is unique and 
was hand collected from emission papers or reports of companies from the sample. 
 6 hypothesis were tested : 
H1 There is a positive relationship between board independency and IPO underpricing of 
Russian companies listed on stock exchange; 
H2 There is a negative relationship between board experience of directors and IPO 
underpricing of Russian companies listed on stock exchange; 
H3 There is a positive relationship between average tenure of director on board and IPO 
underpricing of Russian companies listed on stock exchange; 
H4 There is a negative relationship between multiple directorships on board and IPO 
underpricing of Russian companies listed on stock exchange; 
H5 There is a positive relationship between number of foreign directors on board and IPO 
underpricing of Russian companies listed on stock exchange; 
H6 There is a negative relationship between director’s ownership of shares on and IPO 
underpricing of Russian companies listed on stock exchange. 
All of aforementioned hypothesis were check for both samples separately. 
To check hypothesis  4 linear regression were ran  models in STATA 14 software. 
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Based on results of linear regression hypothesis 2, 3, 3, 4, and 5 for London Stock Exchange 
subsample and hypotheses 3 for MOEX/RTS subsample were accepted. Hypotheses 2 for MOEX 
subsample was rejected 
 Results of conducted analysis led us to the fact that the most impactful board characteristics 
for Russian companies are tenure and number of foreign directors (only for LSE-listed companies). 
In genera 
Findings of this thesis clearly have several managerial implications both from companies and 
investors perspective. Investors can pay attention to specific characteristics in order to search for 
companies with higher first days return while companies can manipulate composition of board to 
influence results of upcoming IPO. 
Finally, several limitations of this paper which can be taken into consideration for future 
researches were highlighted. First of all, sample of companies was rather limited and can be increased 
in future works. Secondly, this thesis is devoted to basic characteristics of board of directors and do 
not take into a number of aspects such as education, gender, reputation of directors. Finally, it was 
discovered that chosen control variables were not very explanatory for conducted analysis and it is 
suggested to expand set of base-vector variables in further researches. 
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Appendix 1.List of companies in data sample 
Name Year SE Name Year SE Name Year SE 
Transsibir 2003 LSE PolymetalINT 2011 LSE Vozrozhdenie 2007 MOEX 
AFK Sisitema 2005 LSE FosAgro 2011 LSE Sberbank 2007 MOEX 
X5 Retail Group 2005 LSE GPMI 2011 LSE OGK-3 2007 MOEX 
EVRAZ 2005 LSE NOMOS 2011 LSE TGK-6 2008 MOEX 
Novatek 2005 Etalon 2011 LSE TKG-7 2008 MOEX 
Urals Energy 2005 LSE Rusagro 2011 LSE TKG-13 2008 MOEX 
Amtel 2005 LSE GMS 2011 LSE Mechel 2009 MOEX 
NLMK 2005 LSE FKS ES 2011 LSE/MOEX Bank Moskvy 2009 MOEX 
Amur Minerals 2006 LSE Megafon 2012 LSE/MOEX RNT 2010 MOEX 
Chercizovo 2006 LSE/MOEX Medical Group 2012 LSE/MOEX Diod 2010 MOEX 
Rosneft 2006 LSE/MOEX RusPetro 2012 LSE KTK 2010 MOEX 
Peroneft 2006 LSE TKS bank 2013 LSE PROTEK 2010 MOEX 
TMK 2006 LSE/MOEX Lenta 2014 LSE Russkoe more 2010 MOEX 
CCZ 2006 LSE/MOEX En+ 2017 LSE SK institution 2010 MOEX 
Sistema Gals 2006 LSE RBK 2002 MOEX Farmsintez 2010 MOEX 
Severstal 2006 LSE Kalina 2004 MOEX Mostotrest 2010 MOEX 
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VTB 2007 LSE/MOEX Irkut 2004 MOEX Utinet 2011 MOEX 
Pharmastandart 2007 LSE/MOEX SOLLERS 2005 MOEX Multisistema 2012 MOEX 
AFI Development 2007 LSE PAVA 2005 MOEX ALROSA 2013 MOEX 
MMK 2007 LSE/MOEX Lebedyanskiy 2005 MOEX Zhivoi Ofis 2013 MOEX 
Sitronix 2007 LSE Raspadskaya 2006 MOEX MOEX 2013 MOEX 
Integra 2007 LSE OGK-5 2006 MOEX NKHP 2015 MOEX 
LSR group 2007 LSE/MOEX Magnit 2006 MOEX Evroplan 2015 MOEX 
NMTP 2007 LSE/MOEX Razgulyai 2006 MOEX MKB bank 2015 MOEX 
UralKalii 2007 LSE/MOEX Belon 2006 MOEX OVK 2016 MOEX 
OGK-2 2007 LSE/MOEX TGK-1 2007 MOEX FG Future 2016 MOEX 
PIK Group 2007 LSE/MOEX Arsagera 2007 MOEX Russneft 2016 MOEX 
GlobalTrans 2008 LSE Sinergia 2007 MOEX Obuv Rossi 2017 MOEX 
Akron 2008 LSE/MOEX Bank Sankt-
Peterburg 
2007 MOEX Globaltrack 2017 MOEX 
RusGidro 2009 LSE DVMP 2007 MOEX Detski Mir 2017 MOEX 
Transkonteiner 2010 LSE/MOEX Mvideo 2007 MOEX    
Mail.ru 2010 LSE Rosinter 2007 MOEX    
OKEY 2010 LSE Dixi 2007 MOEX    
Appendix 2.Correlation matrix for LSE 
Appendix 3. Correlation matrix for MOEX/RTS 
 
 
Appendix 4. Algorithm of identifying independency of director 
 Criteria according to Code of Corporate Conduct of 2002 Criteria according to Code of 
Corporate Conduct 2014 
1. Outside directors are separated from inside directors  Same 
2. Only directors with no share ownership can be independent. If director has share 
of equity his is considered to be dependent 
If director owns more than 1% of voting 
shares of company he cannot be 
considered independent  
3. If directors has direct ties with government he cannot be considered 
independent. If director is government official he also cannot be considered 
independent 
If director has experience of workings as 
government official one year prior to an 
IPO he cannot be considered independent 
4. Only directors with tenure of less than 7 years can be considered independent. Same 
5. If directors has any type with affiliated person or body he cannot be considered 
independent. If director serves as executive on any affiliated with the company 
board he cannot be considered independent 
Same 
6. If examined company is subsidiary of another company than director is check 
whenever he has any affiliations with controlling company. If he has any of 
affiliations mentioned above in respect to controlled company he cannot be 
considered independent 
Same 
7. In case if only limited information about director is provided, including 
information about only last 5 years of director’s background and this 
information does not provide enough sufficient information about independency 
of director than additional research on directors’ biography should be 
conducted. 
Same 
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